27 results
Contributors
- Edited by Lara Denis, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Oliver Sensen, Tulane University, Louisiana
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Lectures on Ethics</I>
- Published online:
- 05 May 2015
- Print publication:
- 23 April 2015, pp ix-xii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Chapter 9 - The elusive story of Kant’s permissive laws
- from Part II - Practical Philosophy
- Edited by Lara Denis, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, Oliver Sensen, Tulane University, Louisiana
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Lectures on Ethics</I>
- Published online:
- 05 May 2015
- Print publication:
- 23 April 2015, pp 156-169
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
5 - Intelligible possession of objects of choice
- Edited by Lara Denis, Agnes Scott College, Decatur
-
- Book:
- Kant's Metaphysics of Morals
- Published online:
- 10 January 2011
- Print publication:
- 28 October 2010, pp 93-110
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
This chapter maps out Kant's arguments on how to have something as one's own. Kant has three concepts of possession: empirical physical possession, possession as a pure concept of the understanding, and intelligible possession. Notable about Kant's discourses on the permissive law in "Toward Perpetual Peace" is that they provide what might be called a justification for a temporary period of time to right a wrongful situation. Interpreting the permissive law as a power-conferring norm has the benefit of making the Kant text comprehensible. Kant's sole prerequisite for being permitted to take an external object into one's possession is that no one else's freedom of choice is violated through the taking. Kant's entire line of argumentation on original acquisition of external things can be applied by analogy to derived acquisition under contract or by virtue of a family relationship.
Contributors
-
- By Rose Teteki Abbey, K. C. Abraham, David Tuesday Adamo, LeRoy H. Aden, Efrain Agosto, Victor Aguilan, Gillian T. W. Ahlgren, Charanjit Kaur AjitSingh, Dorothy B E A Akoto, Giuseppe Alberigo, Daniel E. Albrecht, Ruth Albrecht, Daniel O. Aleshire, Urs Altermatt, Anand Amaladass, Michael Amaladoss, James N. Amanze, Lesley G. Anderson, Thomas C. Anderson, Victor Anderson, Hope S. Antone, María Pilar Aquino, Paula Arai, Victorio Araya Guillén, S. Wesley Ariarajah, Ellen T. Armour, Brett Gregory Armstrong, Atsuhiro Asano, Naim Stifan Ateek, Mahmoud Ayoub, John Alembillah Azumah, Mercedes L. García Bachmann, Irena Backus, J. Wayne Baker, Mieke Bal, Lewis V. Baldwin, William Barbieri, António Barbosa da Silva, David Basinger, Bolaji Olukemi Bateye, Oswald Bayer, Daniel H. Bays, Rosalie Beck, Nancy Elizabeth Bedford, Guy-Thomas Bedouelle, Chorbishop Seely Beggiani, Wolfgang Behringer, Christopher M. Bellitto, Byard Bennett, Harold V. Bennett, Teresa Berger, Miguel A. Bernad, Henley Bernard, Alan E. Bernstein, Jon L. Berquist, Johannes Beutler, Ana María Bidegain, Matthew P. Binkewicz, Jennifer Bird, Joseph Blenkinsopp, Dmytro Bondarenko, Paulo Bonfatti, Riet en Pim Bons-Storm, Jessica A. Boon, Marcus J. Borg, Mark Bosco, Peter C. Bouteneff, François Bovon, William D. Bowman, Paul S. Boyer, David Brakke, Richard E. Brantley, Marcus Braybrooke, Ian Breward, Ênio José da Costa Brito, Jewel Spears Brooker, Johannes Brosseder, Nicholas Canfield Read Brown, Robert F. Brown, Pamela K. Brubaker, Walter Brueggemann, Bishop Colin O. Buchanan, Stanley M. Burgess, Amy Nelson Burnett, J. Patout Burns, David B. Burrell, David Buttrick, James P. Byrd, Lavinia Byrne, Gerado Caetano, Marcos Caldas, Alkiviadis Calivas, William J. Callahan, Salvatore Calomino, Euan K. Cameron, William S. Campbell, Marcelo Ayres Camurça, Daniel F. Caner, Paul E. Capetz, Carlos F. Cardoza-Orlandi, Patrick W. Carey, Barbara Carvill, Hal Cauthron, Subhadra Mitra Channa, Mark D. Chapman, James H. Charlesworth, Kenneth R. Chase, Chen Zemin, Luciano Chianeque, Philip Chia Phin Yin, Francisca H. Chimhanda, Daniel Chiquete, John T. Chirban, Soobin Choi, Robert Choquette, Mita Choudhury, Gerald Christianson, John Chryssavgis, Sejong Chun, Esther Chung-Kim, Charles M. A. Clark, Elizabeth A. Clark, Sathianathan Clarke, Fred Cloud, John B. Cobb, W. Owen Cole, John A Coleman, John J. Collins, Sylvia Collins-Mayo, Paul K. Conkin, Beth A. Conklin, Sean Connolly, Demetrios J. Constantelos, Michael A. Conway, Paula M. Cooey, Austin Cooper, Michael L. Cooper-White, Pamela Cooper-White, L. William Countryman, Sérgio Coutinho, Pamela Couture, Shannon Craigo-Snell, James L. Crenshaw, David Crowner, Humberto Horacio Cucchetti, Lawrence S. Cunningham, Elizabeth Mason Currier, Emmanuel Cutrone, Mary L. Daniel, David D. Daniels, Robert Darden, Rolf Darge, Isaiah Dau, Jeffry C. Davis, Jane Dawson, Valentin Dedji, John W. de Gruchy, Paul DeHart, Wendy J. Deichmann Edwards, Miguel A. De La Torre, George E. Demacopoulos, Thomas de Mayo, Leah DeVun, Beatriz de Vasconcellos Dias, Dennis C. Dickerson, John M. Dillon, Luis Miguel Donatello, Igor Dorfmann-Lazarev, Susanna Drake, Jonathan A. Draper, N. Dreher Martin, Otto Dreydoppel, Angelyn Dries, A. J. Droge, Francis X. D'Sa, Marilyn Dunn, Nicole Wilkinson Duran, Rifaat Ebied, Mark J. Edwards, William H. Edwards, Leonard H. Ehrlich, Nancy L. Eiesland, Martin Elbel, J. Harold Ellens, Stephen Ellingson, Marvin M. Ellison, Robert Ellsberg, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Eldon Jay Epp, Peter C. Erb, Tassilo Erhardt, Maria Erling, Noel Leo Erskine, Gillian R. Evans, Virginia Fabella, Michael A. Fahey, Edward Farley, Margaret A. Farley, Wendy Farley, Robert Fastiggi, Seena Fazel, Duncan S. Ferguson, Helwar Figueroa, Paul Corby Finney, Kyriaki Karidoyanes FitzGerald, Thomas E. FitzGerald, John R. Fitzmier, Marie Therese Flanagan, Sabina Flanagan, Claude Flipo, Ronald B. Flowers, Carole Fontaine, David Ford, Mary Ford, Stephanie A. Ford, Jim Forest, William Franke, Robert M. Franklin, Ruth Franzén, Edward H. Friedman, Samuel Frouisou, Lorelei F. Fuchs, Jojo M. Fung, Inger Furseth, Richard R. Gaillardetz, Brandon Gallaher, China Galland, Mark Galli, Ismael García, Tharscisse Gatwa, Jean-Marie Gaudeul, Luis María Gavilanes del Castillo, Pavel L. Gavrilyuk, Volney P. Gay, Metropolitan Athanasios Geevargis, Kondothra M. George, Mary Gerhart, Simon Gikandi, Maurice Gilbert, Michael J. Gillgannon, Verónica Giménez Beliveau, Terryl Givens, Beth Glazier-McDonald, Philip Gleason, Menghun Goh, Brian Golding, Bishop Hilario M. Gomez, Michelle A. Gonzalez, Donald K. Gorrell, Roy Gottfried, Tamara Grdzelidze, Joel B. Green, Niels Henrik Gregersen, Cristina Grenholm, Herbert Griffiths, Eric W. Gritsch, Erich S. Gruen, Christoffer H. Grundmann, Paul H. Gundani, Jon P. Gunnemann, Petre Guran, Vidar L. Haanes, Jeremiah M. Hackett, Getatchew Haile, Douglas John Hall, Nicholas Hammond, Daphne Hampson, Jehu J. Hanciles, Barry Hankins, Jennifer Haraguchi, Stanley S. Harakas, Anthony John Harding, Conrad L. Harkins, J. William Harmless, Marjory Harper, Amir Harrak, Joel F. Harrington, Mark W. Harris, Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Van A. Harvey, R. Chris Hassel, Jione Havea, Daniel Hawk, Diana L. Hayes, Leslie Hayes, Priscilla Hayner, S. Mark Heim, Simo Heininen, Richard P. Heitzenrater, Eila Helander, David Hempton, Scott H. Hendrix, Jan-Olav Henriksen, Gina Hens-Piazza, Carter Heyward, Nicholas J. Higham, David Hilliard, Norman A. Hjelm, Peter C. Hodgson, Arthur Holder, M. Jan Holton, Dwight N. Hopkins, Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, Po-Ho Huang, James Hudnut-Beumler, Jennifer S. Hughes, Leonard M. Hummel, Mary E. Hunt, Laennec Hurbon, Mark Hutchinson, Susan E. Hylen, Mary Beth Ingham, H. Larry Ingle, Dale T. Irvin, Jon Isaak, Paul John Isaak, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Hans Raun Iversen, Margaret C. Jacob, Arthur James, Maria Jansdotter-Samuelsson, David Jasper, Werner G. Jeanrond, Renée Jeffery, David Lyle Jeffrey, Theodore W. Jennings, David H. Jensen, Robin Margaret Jensen, David Jobling, Dale A. Johnson, Elizabeth A. Johnson, Maxwell E. Johnson, Sarah Johnson, Mark D. Johnston, F. Stanley Jones, James William Jones, John R. Jones, Alissa Jones Nelson, Inge Jonsson, Jan Joosten, Elizabeth Judd, Mulambya Peggy Kabonde, Robert Kaggwa, Sylvester Kahakwa, Isaac Kalimi, Ogbu U. Kalu, Eunice Kamaara, Wayne C. Kannaday, Musimbi Kanyoro, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Frank Kaufmann, Léon Nguapitshi Kayongo, Richard Kearney, Alice A. Keefe, Ralph Keen, Catherine Keller, Anthony J. Kelly, Karen Kennelly, Kathi Lynn Kern, Fergus Kerr, Edward Kessler, George Kilcourse, Heup Young Kim, Kim Sung-Hae, Kim Yong-Bock, Kim Yung Suk, Richard King, Thomas M. King, Robert M. Kingdon, Ross Kinsler, Hans G. Kippenberg, Cheryl A. Kirk-Duggan, Clifton Kirkpatrick, Leonid Kishkovsky, Nadieszda Kizenko, Jeffrey Klaiber, Hans-Josef Klauck, Sidney Knight, Samuel Kobia, Robert Kolb, Karla Ann Koll, Heikki Kotila, Donald Kraybill, Philip D. W. Krey, Yves Krumenacker, Jeffrey Kah-Jin Kuan, Simanga R. Kumalo, Peter Kuzmic, Simon Shui-Man Kwan, Kwok Pui-lan, André LaCocque, Stephen E. Lahey, John Tsz Pang Lai, Emiel Lamberts, Armando Lampe, Craig Lampe, Beverly J. Lanzetta, Eve LaPlante, Lizette Larson-Miller, Ariel Bybee Laughton, Leonard Lawlor, Bentley Layton, Robin A. Leaver, Karen Lebacqz, Archie Chi Chung Lee, Marilyn J. Legge, Hervé LeGrand, D. L. LeMahieu, Raymond Lemieux, Bill J. Leonard, Ellen M. Leonard, Outi Leppä, Jean Lesaulnier, Nantawan Boonprasat Lewis, Henrietta Leyser, Alexei Lidov, Bernard Lightman, Paul Chang-Ha Lim, Carter Lindberg, Mark R. Lindsay, James R. Linville, James C. Livingston, Ann Loades, David Loades, Jean-Claude Loba-Mkole, Lo Lung Kwong, Wati Longchar, Eleazar López, David W. Lotz, Andrew Louth, Robin W. Lovin, William Luis, Frank D. Macchia, Diarmaid N. J. MacCulloch, Kirk R. MacGregor, Marjory A. MacLean, Donald MacLeod, Tomas S. Maddela, Inge Mager, Laurenti Magesa, David G. Maillu, Fortunato Mallimaci, Philip Mamalakis, Kä Mana, Ukachukwu Chris Manus, Herbert Robinson Marbury, Reuel Norman Marigza, Jacqueline Mariña, Antti Marjanen, Luiz C. L. Marques, Madipoane Masenya (ngwan'a Mphahlele), Caleb J. D. Maskell, Steve Mason, Thomas Massaro, Fernando Matamoros Ponce, András Máté-Tóth, Odair Pedroso Mateus, Dinis Matsolo, Fumitaka Matsuoka, John D'Arcy May, Yelena Mazour-Matusevich, Theodore Mbazumutima, John S. McClure, Christian McConnell, Lee Martin McDonald, Gary B. McGee, Thomas McGowan, Alister E. McGrath, Richard J. McGregor, John A. McGuckin, Maud Burnett McInerney, Elsie Anne McKee, Mary B. McKinley, James F. McMillan, Ernan McMullin, Kathleen E. McVey, M. Douglas Meeks, Monica Jyotsna Melanchthon, Ilie Melniciuc-Puica, Everett Mendoza, Raymond A. Mentzer, William W. Menzies, Ina Merdjanova, Franziska Metzger, Constant J. Mews, Marvin Meyer, Carol Meyers, Vasile Mihoc, Gunner Bjerg Mikkelsen, Maria Inêz de Castro Millen, Clyde Lee Miller, Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, Alexander Mirkovic, Paul Misner, Nozomu Miyahira, R. W. L. Moberly, Gerald Moede, Aloo Osotsi Mojola, Sunanda Mongia, Rebeca Montemayor, James Moore, Roger E. Moore, Craig E. Morrison O.Carm, Jeffry H. Morrison, Keith Morrison, Wilson J. Moses, Tefetso Henry Mothibe, Mokgethi Motlhabi, Fulata Moyo, Henry Mugabe, Jesse Ndwiga Kanyua Mugambi, Peggy Mulambya-Kabonde, Robert Bruce Mullin, Pamela Mullins Reaves, Saskia Murk Jansen, Heleen L. Murre-Van den Berg, Augustine Musopole, Isaac M. T. Mwase, Philomena Mwaura, Cecilia Nahnfeldt, Anne Nasimiyu Wasike, Carmiña Navia Velasco, Thulani Ndlazi, Alexander Negrov, James B. Nelson, David G. Newcombe, Carol Newsom, Helen J. Nicholson, George W. E. Nickelsburg, Tatyana Nikolskaya, Damayanthi M. A. Niles, Bertil Nilsson, Nyambura Njoroge, Fidelis Nkomazana, Mary Beth Norton, Christian Nottmeier, Sonene Nyawo, Anthère Nzabatsinda, Edward T. Oakes, Gerald O'Collins, Daniel O'Connell, David W. Odell-Scott, Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Kathleen O'Grady, Oyeronke Olajubu, Thomas O'Loughlin, Dennis T. Olson, J. Steven O'Malley, Cephas N. Omenyo, Muriel Orevillo-Montenegro, César Augusto Ornellas Ramos, Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator, Kenan B. Osborne, Carolyn Osiek, Javier Otaola Montagne, Douglas F. Ottati, Anna May Say Pa, Irina Paert, Jerry G. Pankhurst, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Samuele F. Pardini, Stefano Parenti, Peter Paris, Sung Bae Park, Cristián G. Parker, Raquel Pastor, Joseph Pathrapankal, Daniel Patte, W. Brown Patterson, Clive Pearson, Keith F. Pecklers, Nancy Cardoso Pereira, David Horace Perkins, Pheme Perkins, Edward N. Peters, Rebecca Todd Peters, Bishop Yeznik Petrossian, Raymond Pfister, Peter C. Phan, Isabel Apawo Phiri, William S. F. Pickering, Derrick G. Pitard, William Elvis Plata, Zlatko Plese, John Plummer, James Newton Poling, Ronald Popivchak, Andrew Porter, Ute Possekel, James M. Powell, Enos Das Pradhan, Devadasan Premnath, Jaime Adrían Prieto Valladares, Anne Primavesi, Randall Prior, María Alicia Puente Lutteroth, Eduardo Guzmão Quadros, Albert Rabil, Laurent William Ramambason, Apolonio M. Ranche, Vololona Randriamanantena Andriamitandrina, Lawrence R. Rast, Paul L. Redditt, Adele Reinhartz, Rolf Rendtorff, Pål Repstad, James N. Rhodes, John K. Riches, Joerg Rieger, Sharon H. Ringe, Sandra Rios, Tyler Roberts, David M. Robinson, James M. Robinson, Joanne Maguire Robinson, Richard A. H. Robinson, Roy R. Robson, Jack B. Rogers, Maria Roginska, Sidney Rooy, Rev. Garnett Roper, Maria José Fontelas Rosado-Nunes, Andrew C. Ross, Stefan Rossbach, François Rossier, John D. Roth, John K. Roth, Phillip Rothwell, Richard E. Rubenstein, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Markku Ruotsila, John E. Rybolt, Risto Saarinen, John Saillant, Juan Sanchez, Wagner Lopes Sanchez, Hugo N. Santos, Gerhard Sauter, Gloria L. Schaab, Sandra M. Schneiders, Quentin J. Schultze, Fernando F. Segovia, Turid Karlsen Seim, Carsten Selch Jensen, Alan P. F. Sell, Frank C. Senn, Kent Davis Sensenig, Damían Setton, Bal Krishna Sharma, Carolyn J. Sharp, Thomas Sheehan, N. Gerald Shenk, Christian Sheppard, Charles Sherlock, Tabona Shoko, Walter B. Shurden, Marguerite Shuster, B. Mark Sietsema, Batara Sihombing, Neil Silberman, Clodomiro Siller, Samuel Silva-Gotay, Heikki Silvet, John K. Simmons, Hagith Sivan, James C. Skedros, Abraham Smith, Ashley A. Smith, Ted A. Smith, Daud Soesilo, Pia Søltoft, Choan-Seng (C. S.) Song, Kathryn Spink, Bryan Spinks, Eric O. Springsted, Nicolas Standaert, Brian Stanley, Glen H. Stassen, Karel Steenbrink, Stephen J. Stein, Andrea Sterk, Gregory E. Sterling, Columba Stewart, Jacques Stewart, Robert B. Stewart, Cynthia Stokes Brown, Ken Stone, Anne Stott, Elizabeth Stuart, Monya Stubbs, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, David Kwang-sun Suh, Scott W. Sunquist, Keith Suter, Douglas Sweeney, Charles H. Talbert, Shawqi N. Talia, Elsa Tamez, Joseph B. Tamney, Jonathan Y. Tan, Yak-Hwee Tan, Kathryn Tanner, Feiya Tao, Elizabeth S. Tapia, Aquiline Tarimo, Claire Taylor, Mark Lewis Taylor, Bishop Abba Samuel Wolde Tekestebirhan, Eugene TeSelle, M. Thomas Thangaraj, David R. Thomas, Andrew Thornley, Scott Thumma, Marcelo Timotheo da Costa, George E. “Tink” Tinker, Ola Tjørhom, Karen Jo Torjesen, Iain R. Torrance, Fernando Torres-Londoño, Archbishop Demetrios [Trakatellis], Marit Trelstad, Christine Trevett, Phyllis Trible, Johannes Tromp, Paul Turner, Robert G. Tuttle, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Peter Tyler, Anders Tyrberg, Justin Ukpong, Javier Ulloa, Camillus Umoh, Kristi Upson-Saia, Martina Urban, Monica Uribe, Elochukwu Eugene Uzukwu, Richard Vaggione, Gabriel Vahanian, Paul Valliere, T. J. Van Bavel, Steven Vanderputten, Peter Van der Veer, Huub Van de Sandt, Louis Van Tongeren, Luke A. Veronis, Noel Villalba, Ramón Vinke, Tim Vivian, David Voas, Elena Volkova, Katharina von Kellenbach, Elina Vuola, Timothy Wadkins, Elaine M. Wainwright, Randi Jones Walker, Dewey D. Wallace, Jerry Walls, Michael J. Walsh, Philip Walters, Janet Walton, Jonathan L. Walton, Wang Xiaochao, Patricia A. Ward, David Harrington Watt, Herold D. Weiss, Laurence L. Welborn, Sharon D. Welch, Timothy Wengert, Traci C. West, Merold Westphal, David Wetherell, Barbara Wheeler, Carolinne White, Jean-Paul Wiest, Frans Wijsen, Terry L. Wilder, Felix Wilfred, Rebecca Wilkin, Daniel H. Williams, D. Newell Williams, Michael A. Williams, Vincent L. Wimbush, Gabriele Winkler, Anders Winroth, Lauri Emílio Wirth, James A. Wiseman, Ebba Witt-Brattström, Teofil Wojciechowski, John Wolffe, Kenman L. Wong, Wong Wai Ching, Linda Woodhead, Wendy M. Wright, Rose Wu, Keith E. Yandell, Gale A. Yee, Viktor Yelensky, Yeo Khiok-Khng, Gustav K. K. Yeung, Angela Yiu, Amos Yong, Yong Ting Jin, You Bin, Youhanna Nessim Youssef, Eliana Yunes, Robert Michael Zaller, Valarie H. Ziegler, Barbara Brown Zikmund, Joyce Ann Zimmerman, Aurora Zlotnik, Zhuo Xinping
- Edited by Daniel Patte, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
-
- Book:
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity
- Published online:
- 05 August 2012
- Print publication:
- 20 September 2010, pp xi-xliv
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Appendix II to Chapter 14 - The system of rules of imputation
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 298-308
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
According to Kant's definition, imputation is the judgment through which someone is seen as the author, namely the free cause, of an action “which is then called deed (factum) and is subject to the laws.” This definition is not simply a repetition of Wolff's claim that the application of a law to an act implies imputation of this act. Instead Kant surpasses Wolff by saying that imputation of an action as a “deed (factum)” subjects the action to the law. Imputing an action to another person means I not only see the action as freely undertaken, but also evaluate the action under moral laws. Wolff sees applying the law as a sufficient condition for imputing an action and Kant agrees. Still, Kant also sees imputing the action as a sufficient condition for applying the law. Freedom cannot be conceived other than as freedom subject to the rules of practical reason (morality), or laws of freedom.
The relevant laws to which actions are subjected are not only prescriptions and proscriptions (“You should render first aid!,” “You should not steal!”), but also permissive laws, and primarily the permissive law in §2 of the Doctrine of Right with its extensive consequences for property, contract, and family law. Let us consider legal possession of things, meaning ownership of those things. This legal possession is different from merely physical possession, which belongs to the sensible world and to theoretical cognition of this sensible world.
Chapter 4 - The permissive law in the Doctrine of Right
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 94-106
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The basis for extending our external freedom to include what Kant calls the “external mine and thine” is the permissive law of practical reason. Kant postulates this law in §2 of the Doctrine of Right. The law gives us a moral faculty or authorization to be the owners of physical things, claimants under a contract, holders of family rights. Kant postulates the permissive law because he says it cannot be derived from pure principles of right. Without it we would have the original right to external freedom of choice, but no right to have an external object as our own.
This chapter first examines two different concepts of a permissive law (section 1). These two concepts evolve out of two distinct meanings of the word “permitted.” Kant distinguishes these two meanings of permitted, and bases his permissive law in the Doctrine of Right on the narrower meaning, which he calls “merely permitted” (bloß erlaubt). That the permissive law in the Doctrine of Right is based on the narrower meaning “merely permitted” has not been understood in Kant interpretations. That is because Kant also discusses permissive laws in his earlier Perpetual Peace, basing them there on the broader meaning of the word “permitted.” Kant scholars have focused on the meaning of permitted in Perpetual Peace and not in the Doctrine of Right. Under the broader meaning of permitted, a permissive law is similar to a justification to commit an otherwise prohibited act.
Chapter 8 - The state in reality
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 168-187
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Kant's decisive question on public law is: How is a “supreme state power,” a summum imperium, possible? The question is not: How is an actual dominion of humans over humans possible? History shows it is. “States” indistinguishable from dens of thieves, slavery, despotism, concentration camps, confining walls, and the like have existed from time immemorial. Instead Kant's question is: How is a dominion of humans over humans with the character of law possible? The concept of a supreme state power includes an authorization to establish law, meaning the supreme power has the right to establish law, but more importantly the moral capacity (facultas moralis) to do so. Even for a system of “only positive law,” Kant notes, “a natural law must precede which establishes the lawgiver's authority (i.e. the capacity to obligate others through his choice).” The basic question of the law of state is thus: Why do people who call themselves “lawgivers” have the authority to give law? Kant formulates the question as follows: “In every commonwealth there is a summum imperium [supreme power], and therefore also subditi [subjects]. Prior to any real dominion and subjection, however, there must be a right of human beings according to which it [dominion] is originally possible.” The question thus is: How is legal dominion originally possible?
This question of public law aligns with the questions Kant raises regarding private law. For property law Kant asks: How is legal (as opposed to purely factual) dominion over external things possible?
Contents
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp vii-x
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Appendix I to Chapter 14 - On the logic of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 294-297
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
In Chapter 14 we established the foundation for the human being's duties, rights, and moral faculties. Having a duty means that one is required to commit or omit a specified action. “Duty is that action to which someone is bound.” Duty is predicated on the presumption that the individual who has the duty also has the ability to fulfill its requirements. In this Appendix we briefly discuss the well-known “‘ought’ implies ‘can,’” which, although often attributed to Kant, is indeed older.
The implication contained in “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” can be seen from both a prospective and a retrospective view of the actions we commit or omit. We begin with the prospective and consider rules of conduct functioning to model behavior. From this point of view, a rule tells us what we ought to do in the future (section 1). Inextricably connected to this function is the rule's function to evaluate behavior. In the retrospective, the rule sets the standard for evaluating our past conduct (section 2). From either point of view, when we apply a rule to an act we assume that the actor can act, or could have acted, according to the rule's requirements.
Chapter 5 - The external mine and thine
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 107-121
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The permissive law we discussed in Chapter 4 extends my external freedom to include not only freedom from someone else's necessitating choice but also freedom to have external objects of choice as my own. In this chapter we continue with Kant's ideas on the external mine and thine, showing Kant's development of the idea of possession from physical or empirical possession to intelligible possession of external objects of choice. Kant begins by distinguishing four concepts of possession, which we discuss in section 1. In section 2, we turn to Kant's question of how possession as mine is possible. Section 3 focuses on possession of external things, as opposed to possession of objects of choice in general. In particular, section 3 discusses Kant's question of how a right in rem, or an ownership right, as opposed to a right in personam, or a right against a specific person, such as under a contract, is possible.
Kant's concepts of possession
Kant states that the subjective condition of the possibility to use an external object of choice is possession. In order to use something I must possess it. Kant continues by distinguishing four different meanings of possession. Possession can be (1) holding a thing in my hand or otherwise physically occupying it. He calls this possession “empirical possession.” Possession can also be (2) having something under my control, such as by locking the doors and windows to my house when I leave it.
Chapter 1 - The idea of the juridical state and the postulate of public law
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 23-43
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
One of the most significant passages in the Doctrine of Right is contained in §41, entitled “Transition from the State of Nature to the Juridical State”:
The juridical state (der rechtliche Zustand) is the relationship among human beings which contains the conditions solely under which everyone can enjoy his rights. The formal principle of the possibility of this state, seen according to the idea of a universal legislating will, is called public justice. In relation to the possibility or reality or necessity of the possession of objects (as the substance of choice) according to laws, public justice can be divided into protective (iustitia tutatrix), mutually acquiring (iustitia commutativa), and distributive justice (iustitia distributiva). – Here law first says merely what conduct internally according to its form is right (lex iusti); second, what as substance is also externally capable of law, i.e. what state of possession is juridical (lex iuridica); third, what, and through the judgment of a court in a particular case under the given law, is in accordance with it [the law], i.e. what is established as right (lex iustitiae), where one then calls that court the justice of a country, and whether such justice exists or not can be called the most important of all juridical issues.
Chapter 6 - Intelligible possession of land
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 122-142
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Imbedded in his discussion of property law, Kant comments that the range of a country's cannons to defend coastal waters it claims to possess is the appropriate standard for determining whether a piece of the ocean belongs to the claiming country or not. The comment comes as a surprise because it seems to raise an issue of international rather than property law. This feeling of surprise can be attributed to the traditional philosophical treatment of the issue of property rights, particularly property rights to land. Traditionally authors searching for a justification of ownership rights to land concentrated on why individuals can own land, but not on why a state has any right to an area over which it exercises its dominion. Kant, exceeding far beyond this philosophical tradition, seeks to provide one single justification for both individual and state rights to land because he realizes the issues are inseparably connected. Sections 1–17 of the Doctrine of Right, where Kant develops property law and its foundations, thus apply equally to an individual's acquisition and intelligible possession of a thing and to a state's acquisition and intelligible possession of an area of land.
In this chapter, we first discuss Kant's original community of the earth (communio fundi originaria) and the roots it has in the Grotius–Pufendorf tradition (section 1). We then explain why Kant claims that this community with its originally united will is original, meaning part of the lex iusti (section 2).
Chapter 9 - International and cosmopolitan law
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 188-214
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Kant devotes very few pages to international and even fewer to cosmopolitan law. Nonetheless, as he himself notes, much of what he says about private and state law can be applied analogously to the international and cosmopolitan arenas. In this chapter we do just that. Our conclusion is that Kant has a vision of international and cosmopolitan law we today have come nowhere near attaining.
Far from accepting a loose league of states, such as the United Nations, or a commercial negotiation forum, such as the World Trade Organization, Kant envisions a state of nation states and a cosmopolitan legal order, both with courts backed by coercive enforcement powers, as the ideal solution to ensuring peace on the international and cosmopolitan levels. Until we secure the rights of individuals in their relations to nation states and of nation states in their relations to each other, as well as the rights of whole peoples in their mutual trading relations, all rights remain provisional, even rights within our own juridical states.
We begin with the authority we have to coerce others to leave the state of nature and enter a juridical state. We show that this authority is a form of preventive defense based on the presumption of badness Kant makes in the Doctrine of Right. The presumption of badness can be dispelled only if everyone provides security that he will not violate anyone else's rights. One provides this security by entering a juridical state (section 1).
Introduction and methods of interpretation
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 1-22
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The Doctrine of Right is Kant's masterpiece on legal and political philosophy. The work is highly structured and meticulously formulated. In it Kant makes a few simple assumptions he calls “axioms” and “postulates” and from those assumptions the whole doctrine of right unfolds systematically. It unfolds Kant's most mature thoughts on the peace project. As Kant indicates in the Conclusion to the Doctrine of Right, the whole aim of that work is to ensure lasting peace. Peace is ensured in Kant's view by securing and protecting individual rights. Thus Kant's most significant contribution to legal and political philosophy is dedicated to the peace project and is about rights and how those rights can be ensured.
Rights can be ensured only in a “juridical state.” Kant fathered the idea of a juridical state, which in German is called the Rechtsstaat, or in English a state under “the rule of law,” a state guaranteeing “due process of law.” Unlike authors before, during, or after Kant's time, Kant expands his inquiry beyond the juridical state of one nation to include the juridical state of nation states and the cosmopolitan juridical state. Kant's ideas thus encompass international law to ensure rights globally and cosmopolitan law to ensure world trading relations and permit peoples to offer themselves freely for commerce with one another. Kant indeed is the only author who provides one single model designed to ensure peace on the national, international, and cosmopolitan levels.
Index
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 321-336
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Bibliography
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 309-320
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Kant's Doctrine of Right
- A Commentary
- B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka
-
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010
-
Published in 1797, the Doctrine of Right is Kant's most significant contribution to legal and political philosophy. As the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, it deals with the legal rights which persons have or can acquire, and aims at providing the grounding for lasting international peace through the idea of the juridical state (Rechtsstaat). This commentary analyzes Kant's system of individual rights, starting from the original innate right to external freedom, and ending with the right to own property and to have contractual and family claims. Clear and to the point, it guides readers through the most difficult passages of the Doctrine, explaining Kant's terminology, method and ideas in the light of his intellectual environment. One of the very few commentaries on the Doctrine of Right available in English, this book will be essential for anyone with a strong interest in Kant's moral and political philosophy.
Appendix to Chapter 2 - Iustitia tutatrix, iustitia commutativa, and iustitia distributiva and their differences
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 71-76
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
In what follows we digress from the last chapter to sketch Kant's train of thought leading to the three institutions (iustitia tutatrix, iustitia commutativa, and iustitia distributiva). This digression should also make Kant's terminology more transparent. We show that Kant originally distinguished only between commutative justice and distributive justice, and did not discuss the idea of protective justice as embodied in the iustitia tutatrix at all. As noted in Chapter 1, Kant does not use the Scholastic understanding of commutative and distributive justice. For the Scholastics, commutative and distributive justice were virtues. For Kant, in contrast, they are institutions. We explain the radical change between the Scholastic and Kant's views of these two types of justice, tracing this change to Hobbes. Indeed, Hobbes not only provides the frame of reference for Kant's definitions of commutative and distributive justice, but also formulates an early version of what for Kant later becomes the postulate of public law with its dictate to move to a juridical state. Kant refines Hobbes' concepts and ultimately adopts a third – protective justice – by the time he writes the Doctrine of Right.
KANT'S DEVELOPMENT OF HOBBES' DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
We find the background for Kant's ideas on public justice in Hobbes' thoughts on the concepts iustitia commutativa and iustitia distributiva. In Leviathan, as in De Cive, Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition and with it the Scholastic definitions of commutative and distributive justice.
Chapter 12 - Contract law II. Kant's table of contracts
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 245-260
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Section 31 of the Doctrine of Right contains a “Dogmatic Division of all Contractually Acquirable Rights.” Kant says that a dogmatic division is a division according to a principle a priori, as opposed to a fragmentary empirical division, which cannot resolve the question of whether the division is complete. Kant claims that his division is complete and specific and thus comprises a real system of all derivatively acquirable rights.
Divisions of contracts have existed since Antiquity. The Digests understand market activity as the exchange of goods and services, and arrive at a four-part division of contracts by combining two elements, namely to give (dare) something, or to do (facere) something:
Achenwall reduces the classic four-part division to a three-part division. Kant agrees with Achenwall's reduction because Do ut facias and Facio ut des describe the same process. Kant's table of contracts, however, extends far beyond this model. As it is imperative for the reader to have the table in order to understand this chapter, we are including it here in full:
A. The gratuitous contract (pactum gratuitum) is:
(a) The keeping of entrusted goods (depositum).
(b) The lending of a thing (commodatum).
(c) The donation (donatio).
B. The onerous contract.
I. The contract of exchange (permutatio late sic dicta).
(a) The barter (permutatio stricte sic dicta). Goods for goods.
(b) The purchase and sale (emtio venditio). Goods for money.
(c) The loan (mutuum): exchange of a thing under the condition of getting it back in kind (e.g. grain for grain, or money for money).
Chapter 14 - The human being as a person
- B. Sharon Byrd, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Germany, Joachim Hruschka, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
-
- Book:
- Kant's <I>Doctrine of Right</I>
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 18 March 2010, pp 279-293
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
In the eighteenth century, Swedish natural scientist Carl von Linné wrote his seminal Systema Naturae (System of Nature), transforming biology into a systematic scientific discipline, much like Newton systemized the laws of physics. Next to the homo troglodytes, or the orangutan, and under the name homo sapiens Linné includes the human being in his highest category of mammals, the primates. Linné writes the line from the pronaos in Delphi: “Know thyself” next to the homo sapiens. In a footnote, Linné says that such self-awareness is the highest level of wisdom.
Linné is not the first to regard human beings as animals. In Antiquity, the human being was called a rational animal (animal rationale). Still, Linné's placement of the human being within a biological system changes attitudes fundamentally. Linné converts the human being into an object of empirical observation by analyzing and comparing him to other animals. The human being's nature as a moral being with duties, rights, and moral faculties thus becomes separated from, indeed irrelevant to, his nature as just one more of the animal species. Since a natural scientist (qua natural scientist) can neither understand nor sensibly discuss duties, rights, and moral faculties, Linné's comment “Know thyself” (a moral imperative) seems misplaced in Systema Naturae. Still, it reminds us that moral philosophy remains relevant in studying human conduct.